In the summer of 1972, Larry Roberts, who was funding ARPANET, went to see Howard Rosenblum of the NSA [National Security Agency] with a very reasonable proposition: "We have a US$100-million-a-year military research project, and we ought to think about security. " I wasn't in that conversation, but I infer that they agreed but couldn't settle on the next steps because Roberts didn't want to fund any secret research and Rosenblum didn't want to do anything else. Roberts had a job in which his principal investigators had to listen to whatever he wanted to talk about, so that week he talked about network security. My boss, John McCarthy, got excited about the subject. He came to the lab and chatted us up about network security. Several people were interested, but I was the only one who stayed interested.
At the time, cryptography dominated network security in our minds, so I began studying it. Six months later, McCarthy was fed up because the NSA was supporting me with under-the-table money to work on a different problem: proof of correctness of programs. I took an indefinite leave of absence and was terminated after a year. I began traveling around the country. I had originally intended to travel the world but was interrupted by my first discovery-meeting my wife in New Jersey. Without that discovery, I probably wouldn't have made any of the others.
We [DiffieHellman] and criticize the proposed DES. The two things were confused, and public-key cryptography was attacked as though it were a competing product-which, in fact, was very good for its publicity.
Can you explain the notion of splitting public and private keys and how that impacts key distribution?
The classical technique of cryptography is purely an amplifier. You take the key, which is small-100 bits or so-and amplify the security of the key to be the security of the message, which could be gigabits. The problem with this technique is that you have to start with a fairly intimate relationship with the person you're talking to. I wanted to secure all the telephones in North America. I figured there were approximately 100 million phones, which is a moderate-scale system that requires 10 16 keys.
In either of its two manifestations-Diffie-Hellman or RSApublic-key cryptography splits the keying information into two components: public and private. The two function a bit differently. DiffieHellman is like a perfect system for Bridge bidding: north and south are talking to each other a little better than east and west because north and south can each see one of the hands they're discussing, whereas east and west can't see either. Imagine a public negotiation between two people. Observers listen to every bid and every response, but at the end of the discussion, the negotiators share a secret that none of the observers know. That's the approach that became the DiffieHellman system.
Another way of envisioning it is to split the cryptographic key in such a way that there's an encrypting capability and a decrypting capability, and you can't decipher one from the other. If I want to send you a message, I go to the phone book, look up what's now your public key, encrypt the message with your public key, and send it to you. Even though everyone can know your public key and everyone sees the message I sent, only you-the one person who has the private key-can decrypt it.
I was intrigued to learn that you worked with John McCarthy at the AI lab. What were you working on back then? I had been working on proof of correctness of programs, and I was very pleased to have been rescued from it by cryptography because, although it's made some progress, it hasn't made as much progress as cryptography, and I don't believe my work on it was headed to making the difference. I always envisioned it as a matter of building complex and reliable computer programs, and McCarthy and I wanted to take both areas qualitatively beyond what we had at the time.
Commercial tools can do some very basic stuff now, but we certainly need more progress there. We've made almost no progress in being able to find design flaws. We can find a local problem and isolate it to a certain area that's mostly syntactic in nature, but we haven't figured out how to automate what a designer does.
My analysis of some of the 1980s ARPA-ish work was that a fourstep process went from the formal spec-what the US Army had asked for-to a high-level formal spec to a low-level formal spec to code, and the best results were improving correspondence between the high-and low-level formal specs. There was no clear way to formalize the top layer of this process, and the bottom layer is the one that has done poorly. I would've said this has gone toward the concept of proof-carrying code. I was interested in proving the correctness of programs in general.
My fantasy was an automated space station-something you might see in Battlestar Galactica or Deep Space Nine. Objects are constantly coming and going very fast, and if one hits you there will be the devil to pay, so the programs that run the space station really have to be correct. But proof-carrying code has a different view, which is that you don't try to prove everything, you merely try to prove that the code has certain properties. An obvious one is proper stack management.
My still is-that we can't write correct programs and prove programs correct because we don't know how to write programs.
One of things I worked on at the AI Lab that I was pleased with that also interested McCarthy was organizing. I was working on organizing the LISP complier in such a way that if you didn't tamper with certain pieces of it, you wouldn't get stack errors. If you didn't tamper with a layer below that, you wouldn't get syntactic errors in the assembly code. In my view, a special relativity is a worship-worthy discovery. Who would've thought that the problem of resolving Galilean relativity against the constancy of the speed of light was going to be to make time change? Th at man deserves the respect he gets.
A few years ago, I read Rebecca Goldstein's biography of [Kurt] Gödel, which contained a statement that every young aspiring intellect should hear: Gödel was determined not to waste his time on any problem that could be solved by lesser minds. Now, that's really good career guidance. He looked to things and asked, "What are the most important problems?," and then set out to solve them. I want to ask you a quasipolitical cryptography-related question. Th e FBI director, James Comey, seems to imply that he'd like to put some back doors into modern systems for law enforcement reasons, which many of us think is a terrible idea. Why is this a terrible idea?
Th e bott om line of society is that you bear the consequences of your actions. So, if I know something that the court can legitimately order me to tell them, I can either tell them or go to jail. [American journalist] James Risen is willing to go to jail rather than to reveal his source because he thinks the right and the power of reporters to talk to sources and protect them is indispensable to the news business and to democracy.
Comey wants to take away that choice. Th e state can always take any information you have without your permission, so that you have no freedom to refuse the state anything. Th at's a relatively new notion. So, privacy of communication had certain limits, but there was a solid privacy of face-to-face communication, which was the most important mode of communication at that time. Since the 20th century or so, remote real-time communication has become feasible and has risen to challenge face-to-face communication as a component of culture. You and I might never meet, but we can talk very satisfactorily on the telephone. Some people in society never meet the people they work or otherwise communicate with. We can expect that, as communications improve and we go from kilobaud to terabaud, the occurrence of these remote encounters will be greater and greater.
If remote communication must be accessible to the state, society will have an awful bug in the sense that it can move away from freedom in a way that can't be corrected. To paraphrase [lawyer and politician] Frank Church, if the intelligence community can turn its power on the American people, there will be no freedom and no way to restore democracy. I think that looks very prophetic at the moment. 
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to that. It's a very difficult problem to solve because, in one sense, it's clearly gotten worse since then. Imagine you have a spaceship that's 1,000 kilometers across, but if you speak a person's name, they can hear you from wherever they are. So, there's no privacy: the spaceship tracks where everybody is, and knows who knows whom.
If you have trust, or if you put aside the issue of trust, this situation offers all sorts of wonderful things. It's great to have systems tracking you so they know where to find you when you want to be found. For instance, they can tell you which restaurants are local. All these things that Google and others are either doing or developing are immensely useful.
The problem is that the word privacy doesn't express the difference between the things you want and the things you don't want. People say things like "there's no privacy in small towns," and in a large sense that's true. Small towns have a lot of accountability because the people who know about you are people you know about. They're not capriciously going to offend you because they're just as vulnerable to you as you are to them. On the other hand, ChoicePoint and Equifax and such couldn't care less about us. We have no visibility into their operations, and they have a lot of visibility into ours, so there's that asymmetry of transparency in which the individual is transparent to the large organizations, but the large organizations aren't accountable to the individuals.
